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Personal Jurisdiction Under Article 2, UCMJ
Whither Russo, Catlow, arid Brown?
Cpt(P) David A. Schlueter, JAGC

"
Congress has a constitutional duty to protect military personnel
from quasi-civilians moving among them with a known license to commit
service-connected crimes without fear of court-martial punishment." 1
In October 1979, Congress exercised its "constitutional duty" -its long-recognized powers
of control of the armed forces. 2 It amended
Article 2 the Uniform Code of Military Justice
to provide for court-martial jurisdiction over a
wide range of individuals who might not have
otherwise baen considered service members for
purposes of personal jurisdiction. The amendment cuts to. the heart of a number of controversial Court of Military Appeals decisions
which had voided enlistments on a variety of
grounds. 3

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a person serving with an armed force
who-

Although the amendment appears to settle
some jurisdictional issues, it also raises a number of new legal issues and practical problems.
Some of these issues have been raised and decided before under other jurisdictional arguments. Others remain untested. Before addressing a variety of issues which counsel may expect to see litigated, we turn first to the statute
itself.

(4) performed military duties; ·
is subject to this chapter until such person's
active service has been terminated in accordance with law or regulations prom~lgat~d . by
the Secretary concerned. 5

The Amendment

4

Article 2, U.C.M.J. was amended as follows:
( 1) by inserting " {a)" before "The" at the
beginning of such section; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections :
(b) The voluntary enlistment of any person
who has the capacity to understand the significance of enlisting in the armed forces shall be
valid for purposes of jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this section, and a change of status
from civilian to member of the armed forces
shall be effective upon ·the taking of· the oath
of enlistment.

(1) submitted voluntarily to military authority;
(2) met the mental competency and minimuin age qualifications of sections 504 ~P<t 505
of this title at the time of voluntary submission
to military authority;
(3) received military pay or allowances;
and

The changes resulted from. hearings conducted in 1978 and 1979 by the Senate Armed
Services Committee on the continuing problem
of recruiter misconduct. During its inquiry, fhe
committee learned of the Court of Military
Appeals' position on fraudulent enlistments.' In
the committee's report on the proposed amendments, the "serious" problem created for the
military by those decisions was addressed. In
language which clearly i~di~ates'the 'tenoro{
its intent, the committee stated.:.
Several instances came to the committee's attention where accused military
members raised the issue of recruiter malpractice after commission of an offense,
succeeded in obtaining a ruling of no juris. diction, and were thereupon returned to
duty for a time (before administrative
separation could be effected) completely
immune from military discipline. This situ-
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ation is made intolerable in the case of
alleged recruiter malpractice by the fact
that the burden of proof on the j urisdictional issue shifts to the government after
being raised by the accused, forcing the
government to prove that there was no
recruiter malpractice many months or
years after the fact, with the recruiter
miles away or out of the service. The committee learned that in many instances
accused military members were simply discharged after raising the defense because
of the difficulty of affirmatively proving
that the enlistment was valid, thereby escaping just punishment for their offenses. 6
The proposed changes may be best characterized, as did the committee,- as the Grimley provision (Subsection (b)) and the constructive
enlistment provision ( Subs~ction (c)).
Subsection (b) establishes criteria for a
"valid" enlistment under Subsection (a) of
Article 2. 7 If the individual possesses the
"capacity to understand the significance of enlistment in the armed forces" and voluntarily
enlists, that individual is considered amenable
to jurisdiction. In proposing this amendment
the committee intended to overrule the rule in
United State[! v. Russo, 8 that an enlistment
could be voided if a recruiter had intentionally
effeCted a fraudulent enlistment .. The 'amendment is not intended to condone recruiter mis:feasance or malfeasance 9 but rather to reaffirm
the Supreme Court's decision in In re Grimley. 10
Subsection (c) codifies the doctrine of constructive enlistment: If for any reason there is
an "invalid" enlistment the individual effects a
constructive enlistment at the time the four
criteria are satisfied-notwithstanding any
statutory or regulatory disqualification. 11 According to the committee, this section overrules
the 1 'estoppel" theory which had in the past
prevented the Government from relying on a
constructive enlistment rationale when showing
personal jurisdiction. 12 It also overrules those
decisions which held that an uncured regulatory
disqualification could ·prevent a constructive
enlistment. 13

Issues

The statutory changes to the litigation of
personal jurisdiction will surely raise a multitude of questions and interpretations in the
coming years-a bold challenge for the litigator.
Some of the questions are predictable. Others
are more subtle and may, as often happens in
the area of personal jurisdiction, be absorbed
by larger issues. What follows is a brief discussion of a variety of issues that counsel will
probably see raised in personal jurisdiction
litigation under the new amendment.
A. Retroactive Application.
One of the first questions which must be
addressed is the possible retroactive effect of
the amendment. There is no specific guidance
on this point in the amendment itself or the
published legislative history. Absent such specific intent, the law generally presumes only
prospective application. The statute may nonetheless be applied retroactively if it is not ex
post facto. Here, the amendment was intended
to change jurisdictional rather than substantive
law; it does not now make criminal what was
once lawful. Another point is that the amendment was intended to codify long-standing principles of enlistment law. 4
Although the discussion here does not address
the myriad permutations of the retroactively
question some general points for analysis purposes can be made. First, in analyzing the
retroactively question three dates should be
considered:
Effective date of amendment-9 November
1979;
Date of enlistment (subsection (b));
Date of constructive enlistment (subsection
(c)).

If the amendment is considered wholly retroactive and applicable to all persons now on
active duty, then the dates are of little, if any,
import. However, a more conservative approach
might be to address the retroactivity issue only
after first determining. whether the enlistment,
before 9 November, was in fact void under the
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Russo-Catlow rules. If it was merely voidable,
then jurisdiction may still be based on recent
case law predating the amendment and finding
that voidable enlistments may serve as a valid
jurisdictional base.
Assuming that the enlistment was void and
consummated prior to 9 November, jurisdiction
may possibly be based upon a finding of constructive enlistment after 9 November-the
estoppel argument no longer being valid. To be
on the safe side all other alternatives should be
examined before relying upon retroactive effect
to provide jurisdiction over a clearly void enlistment or constructive enlistment occurring
prior to 9 November 1979. 5
B. Does the Amendment Vest Jurisdiction Over
Civilians?
The committee specifically stated that the new
amendment was not intended to affect civilians
or reservists not on active duty. 16 Rather, it was
designed to reach "those persons whose intent
it is to perform as members of the active armed
forces and who meet the four statutory requirements." 17 Any attempts to read the amendment
as applying to "civilians" would fly in the face
of Supreme Court decisions which have severely
limited court-martial jurisdiction over civiliansY Of interest, however, is the statement in
the committee's report that Subsection (c) overrules United States v. King. 19 You will recall
that King was considered by a majority of the
members of the Court of Military Appeals to
be an interloper not subject to court-martial
jurisdiction. King had not executed an enlistment contract nor had he taken any oaths. He
simply obtained forged travel orders, donned
a uniform, and served for several months with
a unit in Germany before the Government discovered his charade and court-martialed him. 20
The amendment then arguably touches those
individuals who for one reason or another have
not executed a formal agreement or oath to
serve with the armed forces. 21
This broad application need not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Congress intends the
amendment to include civilians. As already

noted, the Committee Report specifically exempts civilians. 22 And the wording of Subsection (c) includes only persons "serving'' with
the armed forces. The provision turns on "actual service" or "de facto. status"-the two
terms sometimes used interchangeably with
"constructive enlistment" by the courts as a
basis for jurisdiction.~~ Practically, the King
scenario occurs only rarely but points counsel
to the intent of Congress in those situations
where an enlistment agreement cannot be
found or there is no proof that an oath was
given; jurisdiction may still vest when Subsection (c)'s criteria can be shown.
C. Competency to Enlist: Statutory and Regulatory Disqualifications.
Has Congress in amending Article 2 indicated
that it will accept a lower standard or quality
for competency to enlist? Is a service member
under 17 years of age at time of trial now
amenable to jurisdiction? What about Felons?
Aliens? Can a service member who suffers from
dyslexia or drug addiction be subject to courtmartial jurisdiction under the amendment?
Congress could certainly exercise its powers
and indicate that no longer would there be any
statutory qualifications to enlist. 24 But it did not
do so in the amendment and there is nothing in
the legislative history to indicate that Congress
was willing to completely abandon a minimum
standard of competency or capacity to enlist. 25
What then of those not statutorily competent
to enlist? Although statutory criteria are only
specifically addressed in Subsection (c), it seems
safe to assume that jurisdiction under either
(b) or (c) will vest only over those individuals
statutorily "competent" to enlist. If a statutory
defect affecting capacity exists at the time of
trial then jurisdiction will not vest under either
Subsection (b) or (c). 26 Thus, a sixteen-year old
service member is not amenable to trial until
reaching the magic age of seventeen. Statutory
restrictions on felons, deserters, and those not
U.S. citizens do not touch "competency" or
"capacity" to enlist and thus would not invalidate jurisdiction under either (b) or (c). 27 The
amendment, however, does vest jurisdiction
over enlistments where the individual lacked
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capacity at the inception but the defect was
cured before trial; there is really nothing new
here. Absent estoppel, the Government has generally been allowed to show a subsequent change
of status under the theory of constructive enlistment. 28
What about those service members serving
with a regulatory disqualification? The amendment does make some changes here. Under
either Subsection (b) or (c) regulatory defects
not affecting capacity do not void jurisdiction! 9
The enlistment may of course be voided by the
government because of the defect but that option is not available to the service member still
on active duty at the time of trial (more on this
later). If the regulatory defect touches "capacity" or "voluntariness' then arguably it may be
treated in the same manner as a statutory defect
amounting to a lack of capacity-both with
regard to Subsection (b) and (c) .00 A service
member with dyslexia or drug addiction could
be amenable to jurisdiction under Subsection
(b) and certainly amenable under Subsection
(c). 31 An enlistment resulting from the "go to
Army or go to jail" routine may be involuntary
under Subsection (b) but later sufficient for
court-martial jurisdiction under Subsection

to be raised. But, whether after actually serving
on active duty the accused can raise serious
questions about his "involuntary" service is a
different matter. 34 Continued Catlow-type protestations by a recruit may still defeat jurisdiction under both Subsections (b) and (c). 35
Although emphasis is usually placed upon
"recruiter" misconduct, litigation has sometimes centered on "government" misconduct. 36
The government will probably still be precluded
from establishing jurisdiction where the facts
support the conclusion that the individual, because of Government actions or inactions, never
voluntarily submitted to military authority.
What of the deterrent effect of Russo? Whether
the Russo decision had the desired "salutory"
effect 37 of reducing recruiter misconduct is debatable. 38 The decision certainly served as a
potential club to be used by recruiting officials;
yet continued recruiting pressures reduced its
effectiveness. The risk of an enlistment later
being voided and the defect traced to a specific
recruiter was simply not sufficient as a deterrent. Important to note here is that Congress
by providing jurisdiction over fraudulent enlistees is not condoning recruiter malpractice. 39

(c) .32

E. Public Policy.

D. Recruiter Misconduct.

The amendments to Article 2 represent Congress' position on public policy. The committee
was disturbed by the doctrines and problems
spawned by the Catlow-Russo decisions and so
stated:

The statutory change was intended to overrule Russo and its progeny. 33 Recruiter misconduct-even an intentional violation of Article
84, UCMJ-will not in itself void an enlistment.
But recruiter misconduct which affects either
the individual's "capacity to understand the significance of enlisting" or "submit voluntarily to
military authority" may still initially (and indirectly) void an enlistment.
For example, where a recruiter successfully
and intentionally paints a false picture of military service for the easily deceived recruit, the
Government's ability to rely on Subsection (b)
for jurisdiction may be limited. Whether that
recruit continued to be deceived would then
raise additional questions regarding the voluntary submission requirement of Subsection (c).
An accused's statement that he was misled by
a fast-talking recruiter will no doubt continue

The committee strongly believes that
these doctrines serve no useful purpose,
and severely undermine discipline and
command authority. No military member
who voluntarily enters the service and
serves routinely for a time should be
allowed to raise for the first time after
committing an offense defects in his or her
enlistment, totally escaping punishment for
offenses as a result. That policy makes a
mockery of the military justice system in
the eyes of those who serve in the military
services. 40
Ironically, the same theme was expressed by
Judge Cook in United States v. Torres. 41 Judge
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Cook concurred in the conclusion that Torres
was not subject to court-martial jurisdiction
because of intentional recruiter misconduct but
noted that he could no longer support the Russo
public policy argument:
Plainly, the Russo doctrine has been used
to destroy the public policy it was designed
to promote. As the public policy considerations perceived in Russo have been perverted, not promoted by its sanction, I
believe the rule it imposed must be abandoned.42.
Is public policy still a consideration in litigating personal jurisdiction questions? Yes, but
not in the image of Russo. The amendment now
expresses the public policy that individuals may
not escape punishment because of the misconduct of a recruiter. But that policy exists only
where the service member is competent and
voluntarily serves. The amendment should not
serve as a signal to recruiters that anything
goes.
F. Effect of Notice to Government of Defective
Enlistment.
One of the points made in the Court of Military Appeals decisions of United States v.
Valadez 43 and United States v. Wagner 44 was
that notice to the Government of a defective
enlistment could operate on "behalf ofan accused
to void jurisdiction. The amendment includes
language in Subsection (c) which provides that
jurisdiction under that provision continues until
the period of service has been "terminated in
accordance with law or regulations promulgated
by the Secretary concerned." 45 This is consistent with existing law which indicates that
status continues until discharge. 46 But, it goes
further. It in effect negates any language in
Valadez and Wagner which would defeat personal jurisdiction once an individual has given
notice to the Government prior to the commission of an offense. In theory this provision provides jurisdiction over those persons who are
in the process of being discharged for any
variety of reasons, including a defective enlistment, when they commit an offenseY

G. Establishing Jurisdiction.
The amendment changes little for the government's overall burden of establishing that an
accused is subject to court-martial j urisdiction.48 The Ale! 49 pleading burden remains.
And it is safe to say that the requisite quantum
of proof will remain the same. 5° However, some
of the practical problems normally associated
with litigating the issue should vanish. In the
large majority of the cases, the recruiter will
not be called; whether the recruiter assisted the
recruit in concealing a defect or passing a test
will be irrelevant.
When the defense raises the spectre of a defective enlistment the Government may meet
that challenge in several ways. First, the Government could establish a prima facie case by
introducing the enlistment contract itself which
evidences directly or indirectly the elements of
Subsection (b). Although the contractual aspects of the enlistment appear to be neutralized
by the amendment, the agreement and oath
establish a voluntary change of status. 51
Secondly, the Government could of course
establish jurisdiction under Subsection (b) with
live witnesses but that would probably require
the presence of the recruiter or other parties
who were present when the enlistment was entered-a practice now fraught with problems. 5 2
A more desirable course might be to simply
assume for the sake of argument that the
accused's enlistment was initially invalid (for
any reason) and proceed with proof under the
constructive enlistment provision of Subsection
(c). Local witnesses and unit records would
normally suffice to show that the accused is
now subject to court-martial jurisdictionY It is
here that the constructive enlistment decisions
serve as a necessary reference for counsel. In
the past few years counsel were often not concerned with establishing constructive enlistments. Most personal jurisdiction cases involved
some form of recruiter misconduct which either
voided the enlistment under Russo or estopped
the government from arguing constructive enlistments under United States v. Brown. 54 Consequently, the large body of law on constructive
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enlistments often remained dormant. 55 The
amendment will certainly change that.
V. Conclusion.
At first blush, the amendments to Article 2
moot most of the personal jurisdiction issues
raised by the Catlow, 56 Russo, 57 and Brown 58
decisions. Closer analysis, however, leads to the
safer conclusion that some issues remain and
newer, perhaps more perplexing, questions are
raised. Another conservative conclusion is that
the foregoing issues only scratch the surface.
The Committee's report-the legislative intent
if you will-is instructive. 59 But the actual,
practical, effect of the amendments will be
determined in the future as the statute is litigated and tested on appeal. In summary, it
might be helpful to set out a two-step approach
to analyzing personal jurisdiction questions
under the recent amendment:
Was the enlistment invalid at its inception? If the accused lacked "capacity" to
enlist or if the enlistment was involuntary
then jurisdiction may not be based on Subsection (b). Recruiter or government misconduct in itself will not void the enlistment. Nor will statutory or regulatory
defects not affecting the accused's "capacity" invalidate jurisdiction.
If the enlistment was initially invalid, did
the accused at some point, prior to trial,
effect a constructive enlistment? That is,
notwithstanding any regulatory or statutory defect, were the four criteria of
Subsection (c) met? If so, the jurisdiction
exists over the accused.
For illustration, the two-step process in assessing jurisdiction under the amendment can be
applied to several scenerios:
Scenerio 1: Private Jones was sixteen
when he enlisted for three years ; he lied
about his age and presented obviously
forged documents to support his sham. The
recruiter noticed the fraud, joked about it
with Jones and then completed the paperwork. Jones told his commanding officer of
the defective enlistment but the latter
ignored Jones' statements. Jones turned

seventeen three (3) weeks before committing the charged offense.

Analysis: The enlistment was invalid at its inception; Jones, age sixteen, lacked the capacity
to enlist. 60 Therefore, jurisdiction should not be
based on Subsection (b). The recruiter's misconduct does not void the enlistment nor does
commanding officer's inaction bar jurisdiction
under Subsection (c). Whether Jones in a
period of three weeks established a constructive enlistment will turn on a further step by
step analysis of the four criteria in Subsection
(c). 61

Scenerio 2: PFC Smith (age eighteen) enlisted in lieu of going to jail-on the
"advice" of the presiding civilian judge.
When he filled out the enlistment paperwork he lied, without the assistance of the
recruiter, about prior drug use and two
arrests. He served for one year, successfully completed the training cycles, received pay, promotions, and excellent performance ratings. On several occasions he
mentioned to his platoon sergeant a desire
to re-enlist.
Analysis: Jurisdiction should not be based on
Subsection (b) due to the initial lack of voluntariness. The probable violations of recruiting
criteria do not void jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
may, however, be based upon Subsection (c);
Smith has apparently fullfilled the four criteria.62
Scenario 3: Private Snats, a twice-convicted felon voluntarily enlisted with the
assistance of recruiter misconduct. Once
on active duty, however, he protested his
status continuously. His company commander was in the process of administratively discharging him (defective enlistment) when Snats was caught selling
heroin.
Analysis: Snats' enlistment was probably valid
under Subsection (b). He voluntarily enlisted
and probably understood the significance of
enlisting. His post-entry protestations might
negate finding jurisdiction under Subsection (c)
if Subsection (b) is determined to be not
applicable. 63 The commanding officer's decision

./-

f
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to administratively eliminate Snats does ~ot bar
jurisdiction; Snats' enlistment may indeed be
defective under the regulation, and still s~rve
as basis for jurisdiction under Subsection (b). 64
The foregoing scenerios present a ~ross
section of some of the more commonly encountered jurisdiction problems. The problems will
remain but the solutions should change with
the amendment to Article 2.
Whither Russo, Catlow, and Brown? The
statutory change indicates that Russo and
Brown have been neutralized. But the voluntariness implications of Catlow remain. 65 If
the statute effects the. desired changes in personal jurisdiction litigation, the military justice
clock will be set back to a time when litigating
jurisdiction issues was simpler----'and perhaps
more certain. Congress has exercised its constitutional duty. What the courts will do with the
amendment is yet to be seen.
Footnotes
1

2

United States v. Barraza, 5 M.J. 230, 233 (C.M.A.
1978) (Fletcher, C.J.). Chief Judge Fletcher in writing this language was not addressing the pure enlistment questions of personal jurisdiction but was
rather addressing a fact situation involving an involuntary activation of a reservist-a "lazy" reservist
-who had not raised deficiencies in the government's
processing of his activation u~til after he . was
charged. The quote, although appropos,· should not
be construed as indicating Judge Fletcher's approval
of the amendment to Article 2. In testimony before
the House Armed·· Services Committee, he strongly
opposed any attempts to overrule the Russo 'doctrine
and its progeny. See Army Times, June 25, 1979, at
8. The amendment would in his estimation "have the
effect of sweeping all ·fraudulent enlistments under
the table." ld. He was joined in opposition to the
amendment by Mr. Eugene Fidell who also testified
before the House Armed Services Committee. Those
supporting the measure included ·the Service Judge
Advocates General, Judge Cook, who personally
offered an alternate amendment (see note 42, infra)
and Professor Robinson Everett.
See e.g., U.S. CONST. art. i § 8, c1 11. (power to
declare war); id. cl. 12 (power to raise and support
armies); id. cl. 14 (power to make rules for the
government and regulation of 'the land and naval
forces).

3

Little would b~· gairied'hereby reiitiga't.lng the merits
of iimiting personal jurisdiction over those serving
under a clouded enlistment. The controver~y until
lately existed primarily among those concerned with
the day-to-day problems caused"by the decisions. But
in the past year the decisions took on an added
dimension as Congress and the press took- a lo~g
look at the situation. T.l;:l~. AI"mY Times, in an editorial
titled "Court Malpractice" noted, iner alia, the following:
The Senate has passed a provision which would
assure court-mar_tial. jurisdiction .o:ver [fraudulent enlistments]. But Court of Military Appeals
Chief Judge Albert B. Fletcher Jr. has argued
that the change would "have the effect of sweeping all :fraudulent enlistments. _under. _th~. t~):lle.
"It would seem to me that an innocent victim
trapped by the gov~rnment should ~ot fall under
the jurisdiction of a military court-~~rtial," he
said. But another member of th~ three-judge
court broke ranks in testimony before the subcommittee. Judge William H. Cook. said he supported efforts to nullify the Catlow-Russo
precedent.
So do we, provided that the 1\nal provisiOn
overturning the Russo rule is drafted in such a
way as to protect people who are act)lally the
victims of recruiter malpractice. A s~ld1~r,. for
example, might have to raise the. malpractice
issue within a short period after entry in the
service or forfeit the right to raise. the argument later.
We might have thought a tad more of the
CMA decision had it. carried its argument to its
logical, legal conclusion. That is, that because
the "soldier" really wasn't in the service, the
Army had no authority to pay, feed, quarter or
clothe him. Maybe that's silly, but so is CatlowRus~o.

Army Times, July 23, 1979.
• The amendment was passed as a part of the Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1980 (S. 428). Pub. L.
No. 96-107 (9 Nov 1979) Additional amendments
were made to Article 36, U.C.M.J. to clarify the
President's authority to promulgate rules of practice
and procedure before courts-martial.
" The amendment's language represents the Senate's
original version. S13e Congressional Record,'
428,
96th Cong, 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S 7272 (1979).
The 'House receded during conference to the Senate's
language. See Congressional Record, 96th Cong, 1st
Session, 125 dONG. REC. H 9319 (1979). See note
6 supra.

s:
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• Senate Report 96-197 Defense Authorization Act,
1980 (S. 428) at 121 [hereinafter cited as Report].
The pertinent portions of the Report are included
as an Appendix to this article. In commenting on S.
428, Senator Nunn noted:

The conferees have also agreed that a more
effective administrative process to permit enlistees to raise questions of the validity of their
enlistment is necessary. The conferees expect the
Secretaries of each of the services to establish
an administrative process that will provide each ·
enlistee a voluntary opportunity to raise any
improper matters in his or her enlistment, as
well as permit service management to uncover
recruiting malpractice. The general framework
of this process shall permit an enlistee at the
end of his basic training period, or at a simi~
larly appropriate point, the opportunity to raise
such matters.

On [the subject of military discipline] the
committee approved an amendment which we
feel will improve military discipline.
The Court of Military Appeals has ruled, under
the so-called "Catlow-Russo" decisions, that
where there is· a defect in the service member's
enlistment, resulting from recruiter misconduct
or some other factor, that defect deprives the
court-martial of jurisdiction to try the accused
for offenses committed in the military. The effect
is to allow persons who commit offenses in the
military to go without punishment. This problem
has been highlighted by all four service chiefs.
The committee amendment provides that a person becomes subject to military justice by taking
the Oath of Enlistment or by voluntarily accepting military duties and military pay. This is not
a provision to condone recruiter malpractice but
simply provides that those who commit crimes
in the military should be subject to military
justice. Congressional Record, 96th Cong, 1st
Session, 125 CONG REC, S 7290 (1979).
And in its report to ·the House, the Conference
Committee on S. 428 stated:
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 801)
intended to improve military discipline by limiting the right of an accused to raise defects in
the eniistment process to defeat court-martial
jurisdiction, and to clarify the President's authority to issue a manual of procedure not only
for trial procedures, but pre-trial and post-trial
procedures as well.

The service secretaries shall report back to
each of the Committees on Armed Services by
December 31, 1979 on the process that will be
established to uncover recruiting malpractice.

Congressional Record, 96th Cong, 1st Session, 125,
CONG. REC. M. 9319 (1979).
7

• 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975).
• The committee specifically noted that the amendment
was not intended to "suggest that recruiter malpractice be tolerated, but reliance should be placed on
prosecution under Article 83 and 84, and on administrative reforms to solve [the problem of recruiter
malpractice]." Report supra note 6 at 122.
137

11

See notes 25-29 infra and accompanying text.

12

The estoppel theory found its genesis in United
States v. Brown, 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974),
gained momentum in United States v. Russo, 1 M.J.
134 (C.M.A. 1975) and peaked in United States v.
Harrison, 5 M.J. 476 (C.M.A. 1978). The estoppel
doctrine prevented the Government from relying on
a constructive enlistment where it had acted unfairly in enlisting an individual. The committee intended to overrule those portions of Brown, Harrison,
and Russo which acted to estop the Government. See
Report supra note 6 at 122.

13

The amendment was also intended to "overrule that
portion of United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. 470
(C.M.A. 1978) which stated that an uncured regulatory defect not amounting to a lack of capacity or
voluntariness prevented application of the doctrine of
constructive enlistment." Report supra note 6 at 122.

10

Report supra note 6 at 122. See also Schlueter, The
Enlistment Contract: .A Uniform Approach, 77 MIL.
L. REV 1, 56-60 (1977). In Post v. United States,
161 U.S. 583 (1896), the Supreme Court distinguished
between statutes affecting substantive law, procedure,
and jurisdiction, the latter two not conside.red under

The House recedes.

The conferees agree that the current management technique of using recruiting quotas has
increased the likelihood of recruiting malpractice.
The Secretary of Defense is urged to review the
management of recruiting in the military services
and to consider an alte.rnative approach to the
current quota system.

u.s.

10

The House amendment has no similar provision.

The House conferees were reluctant to take a
step which might be misinterpreted as providing
further encouragement to an already serious
recruiting malpractice problem. However, it is
inappropriate to addess the issue of malpractice
in a court-martial proceeding.

See note 4 supra.

147 (1890).
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the ex post facto proscription. Cf. Putty v. United
States, 220 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1955) cert. den. 350
U.S. 821 (1955) (change in court's jurisdiction was
ex post facto as a defendant).
"Whh just a pinch of imagination one can readily see
th~ potential for, at least in theory, a whole host of
new issues in litigating personal jurisdiction issues.
The Department of the Army position is that the
amendment is permissibly retroactive to all persons
now on active duty. DA message 131800Z (13 Nov.
1~79). Preliminary indications are that the Navy
will take the same position. Any attempts of course
to "retry" or relitigate an earlier finding of no
jurisdiction over an individual who is awaiting a
discharge would be barred by either law of the case
or res judicata principles. See O'Donnell, Public
Policy and Private Peace-The Finality of a Judicial
Determination, 22 MIL. L. REV. 57 (1963).
16

•• See e.g., United States v. Williams, 302 U.S. 46 (1937)
where the Supreme Court recognized the authority of
Congress to determine who was eligible to enlist.
'"10 U.S.C. § 504 (1970) provides:
No person who is insane, intoxicated, or a deserter from an armed force, or who has been
convicted of a felony, may be enlisted in any
armed force. However, the secretary concerned
may authorize exceptio.ns, in meretorious cases
for enlistment of deserters and persons convicted of felonies.
Failure to meet all statutory qualifications does not
necessarily render one incompetent to enlist. It would
be safe to say that Congress intended to provide for
jurisdiction over those meeting the age and mental
requirements-those requirements mentioned in Grimley. See also United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461
(C.M.A. 1978). Note that Subsection (b) only requires a voluntary enlistment by "any person who
has the capacity to understand the significance of enlisting. . . . " Therefore, a felon who enlists could be
subject to jurisdiction under Subsection (b) and subsection (c). And although 10 U.S.C. § 3253 (1970)
requires that only U.S. citizens (or those lawfully
admitted to the United States for permanent residence) may enlist, an alien could be subject to jurisdiction under both subsections (b) and (c). Part of
problem in analyzing the effect of the amendment is
adjusting to the proposition that jurisdiction under
the new Article 2, UCMJ is not always linked with
what in the past was considered to be a valid enlistment.

Report supra note 6 at 122.
ld.

17

~'

ciated with implied contracts. See King, supra note
20 and accompanying text.

"See e.g., United States ex rei. Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11 (1955) (no jurisdiction over discharged soldier); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (no jurisdiction over civilian dependents accompanying armed
forces overseas during peacetime); and Grisham v.
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (no jurisdiction over
civilian employees in peacetime).
"11 C.M.A. 19, 28 C.M.R. 243 (1959).
20

...,\

King, an E-1, had received an undesirable discharge
in February 1958. Only three days later he obtained
forged orders at Fort Ord authorizing shipment to
Europe via Fort Dix. He received pay and allowances from March 1958 to July 1958. He was charged
with fraudulent enlistment, absence without ·leave,
failure to obey a lawful order, resisting apprehension, forgery, and possession of a false pass. The
majority said that the Army was "just the victim
of a crime committed by a civilian," 28 C.M.R. at 249.
Judge Quinn dissented and noted that more than a
"mere passing masquerade by the accused" had
occurred. He felt that King had procured an actual
. entry into the service.

22

Report supra note 6 at 122.

23

For example, in In re McVey the court noted that the
petitioner was a de facto soldier because he had
voluntarily assumed obligations and had attempted
to secure the rights of a serviceman. And in United
States v. Julian, 45 C.M.R. 876 (N.C.M.R. 1971) the
court rejected the argument that the accused was not
subject to court-martial jurisdiction because he had
been intoxicated when he enlisted. The accused was
subject to jurisdiction because he was in ''actual"
service. Neither decision however, discussed "constructive enlistment" which has normally been asso-

26

This conclusion is supported by the Committee's
Report which specifically mentions the situation involving an individual not meeting the minimum age
requirements at the time of enlistment but who later
successfully enters into a constructive enlistment.
Report supra note 6 at 123.

27

ld. Apparently those under the current statutory age
of seventeen do not possess the capacity to "understand" the significance of enlisting in the armed
forces under Subsection (b). Arguably felons, deserters and those not U.S. citizens can understand
the significance of enlisting. Historically, for example,
lack of citizenship did not always defeat jurisdiction.
See e.g., Ex parte Beaver, 271 F. 493 (N.D. Ohio
1921); Ex parte Dostal, 243 F. 664 (N.D. Ohio 1917).

'"See e.g., United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. 476
(C.M.A. 1978).
"As with the statutory defects, the Grimley rationale
adopted by Congress seems to apply only to those

DA Pam 27-50-84
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regulatory controls which touch the individuals
"capacity" and render the individual non sui generis.
See also United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 (C.M.A.
1978). The Report mentions only two requirements
for a valid enlistment under Subsection (b): capacity
and voluntariness. The criteria of Subsection (c) do
not mention regulatory qualifications. Report supra
note 6 at 122.
"'Id.
31

32

Dyslexia and/or drug addiction could conceivably
defeat jurisdiction under either Subsection (b) or (c)
if such defects continually rendered the individual
non sui generis or prevented formation of a voluntary
enlistment. As a practical matter in only a rare case
would either of those regulatory defects prevent a
constructive enlistment under Subsection (c).
This hypothetical is specifically mentioned in the
Report supra note 6 at 123. But note that if the
choice of "army or jail" was prompted by the accused, his family, or counsel then the resulting enlistment will not necessarily be "involuntary." See United
States v. Lightfoot, 4 M.J. 262 (CMA 1978); United
States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 (CMA 1978).

33

See note 8 supra and accompanying text.

34

In the past if the Government could not satisfactorily
establish the absence of recruiter misconduct, it failed
on two counts: The enlistment w.as usually considered
void ab initio under Russo and the Government could
not show formation of a constructive enlistment.
Now, recruiter misconduct is, in itself, a neutral
factor. Assuming that the Government cannot successfully rebut allegations of the deceived, innocent
recruit, in all likelihood the Government will be able
to show that .at some point before trial, the accused
voluntarily served and thus is subject to jurisdiction
under Subsection (c). A recent Navy Court of Military Review decision emphasizes the potential problems. In United States v. Hurd, M.J. - - (N.C.M.R.
25 Sep 1979) the accused was deceived; he unsuccessfully protested, and then served for one and one-half
years. The court held the enlistment "involuntary"
and estopped the Government from arguing constructive enlistment because of its inaction in correcting a
recruiting abuse. See also notes 51 and 63 infra.
Under the amendment, jurisdiction could be established over Hurd-like cases under subsection (c).

35

The "continued-protestation" point was specifically
made in the Report supra note 6 at 123. Note that
in Catlow, the accused registered his protests through,
among other methods, repeated AWOL's. Will a
one-time verbal protest work? Probably not-especially if the length of service covers an extended
period of time.

311

See e.g., United States v. Marshal, 3 M.J. 612
(N.C.M.R. 1977), where the actions/inactions of a
clerk in a Recruit Training Regiment were the
equivalent of Government misconduct. See also United
States v. Brown, 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974)
where company commander had not acted properly
after notice that accused was underaged.

"'United States v. Russo, 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975)
at 136.
38

See note 42, infra and accompanying text. The amendment was passed by Congress amidst wide-spread
recruiter misconduct investigations, which has resulted in almost three hundred individuals being relieved from recruiting duty.

39

Report supra note 6 at 122. See also the Conference
Committee Report and Senator Nunn's remarks at
note 6 supra.

40

Report supra note 6 at 121. The Conference Committee Report, also note 6 supra, was to same effect.
Historically, public policy considerations generally
weighed in favor of the Government. See Enlistment
Contract, supra note 14 at 46-49.

41

7 M.J. 102 (C.M.A. 1979).

42

7 M.J. at 107. Judge Cook's position was based on his
"personal" observations of the Russo-related problems. He further noted that his observations have
been confirmed by the "Army Chief of Staff and other
senior officials before the Subcommittee on Manpower
and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee."
I d.

/,--

'"5 M.J. 470 (C.M.A. 1978).
«

5 M.J. 461 (C. M.A. 1978). Both Valadez and Wagner
were discussed in Wagner, Valadez, and Harrison:
A Definit-ive Enlistment Trilogy?, The Army Lawyer,
Jan. 1979 at 4.

.uArticle 2(c), U.C.M.J.
46

See United States v. Hutchins, 4 M.J. 190 (C.M.A.
1978).

"Recall that the Congressional intent was to avoid
the situations where individuals could be immune
from prosecution before a discharge would be executed. See note 6, supra and accompanying text.

"See e.g., Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543
(1887); United States v. Barrett, I M.J. 74 (C.M.A.
1977).
., See United States v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414 (C.M.A. 1977).
50

See United States v. Bailey, 6 M.J. 965 (N.C.M.R.
1979) where the Navy Court of Military Review in
an en bane decision addressed procedure and burden

,r
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of proof questions. If the accused's status is not an
underlying element of the charged offense (e.g.
AWOL, desertion) then the question of personal
jurisdiction is decided by the military judge, as an
interlocutory matter, applying a standard of preponderance of the evidence. However, if status is an
underlying element, the issue is decided first by the
judge using a preponderance of the evidence standard
and then by the members using a beyond a reasonable
doubt standard.
51

The enlistment contract normally includes a statement
of understanding between the parties: recruit and
Government. The actual contractual facets of the enlistment are not essential to determining jurisdiction.
Military courts have traditionally emphasized that
jurisdiction is based on status, not contract. In recent
years more "contractual" language found its way
into enlistment decisions. See e.g., United States v.
Russo, 1 M.J. 134, 137 (C.M.A. 1975) (common law
contract principles applied).
Will a breach of contract by the Government defeat
jurisdiction? No. Applying the Grimley rationale,
now codified, a breach of contract will not relieve the
accused from court-martial jurisdiction. See United
States v. Bell, 48 C.M.R. 572 (A.F.C.M.R. 1974)
(breach of contract argument rejected as defense to
AWOL). See also Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317
(lOth Cir. 1957) The accused's charge of breach of
contract may impact, however, on the issue of "voluntariness," essential to finding jurisdiction under either
Subsection (b) or (c). See e.g., United States v. Hurd,
- - M.J. - - (N.C.M.R. 25 Sep 79) where the
court found no jurisdiction over service member whose
enlistment contract had been changed, without his
knowledge, to reflect a different training specialty.
He came on active duty after officially and unsuccessfully protesting several times. The Court said that
his enlistment was involuntary and that Government
inaction estopped it from showing that he had entered
a constructive enlistment in one and one-half years
of service. Under the amendment the Government
would not be estopped. This case clearly points out
that strong equities often exist in favor of the accused
and that the Government must continue to ferret out
irregular enlistment practices. See note 6 supra for
Conference Committee Report to that effect. Defense
counsel faced with this problem should urge that
simply accepting pay, performing duties, etc., does not
establish voluntary service. The longer the period of
service, the tougher the task of showing involuntary
service.

52

See note 6 supra and accompanying text.

53

If jurisdiction is to be grounded or Subsection (c)
under a constructive enlistment, then the validity of
the enlistment, ab initio is of secondary concern.
Using local resources, i.e., the accused's commander,

NCO's, and Military Personnel Records Jacket
(MPRJ) should simplify matters for the Government.
<»

23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974).

"See e.g., United States v. Wagner, 3 M.J. 898
(A.C.M.R. 1977) aff'd 5 M.J. 461 (C.M.A. 1978)
(discussion of constructive enlistment); See also
Constructive Enlistments: A live and Well, The Army
Lawyer, Nov. 19767 at 6.
56

23 C.M.A. 142, 48 C.M.R. 758 (1974).

57

1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975).

""23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974).

,. See Appendix (Extract of Senate Report 96-197)
and note 6 supra (Conference Committee Report).
"

0

01

See notes 26, 27 supra and accompanying text.
The problem is close. Whether three weeks is sufficient
to establish a constructive enlistment could go either
way. Five (5) days service was held to be insufficient
in United States v. Williams, 39 C.M.R. 471 (A.B.R.
1968).

"'This scenerio presents elements of probably the most
common enlistment problem-a regulatory deficiency
coupled with recruiter misconduct followed by a constructive enlistment.
" This scenerio might arise in situations approximating
those of the recent decision in Hurd, supra notes, 34,
51. Special care must be given to these types of not
cases. Although recruiter misconduct may no longer
be the key issue in litigating jurisdiction, the related
problems of changed training requirements, assignments, and other enlistment promises should be expected. The mere breach of the enlistment contract
should not defeat jurisdiction. However, where the
Government has obviously deceived the recruit, as in
Hurd, jurisdiction will probably rest on subsection (c)
only if the servicemember actually served voluntarily
after discovering the deceit. Note that in Hurd it
was apparent that the designated training blank on
the enlistment form had been changed from hospitalman (H--) to mess management (MS). To reach
its result, the Court in effect held that Hurd's oath
and enry into the delayed entry program was voided
by the discovery, 1 month later, that something was
amiss.
Note that if the enlistment is valid under subsection
(b), that is, it was voluntary and the individual had
the capacity to enlist, then subsequent "involuntary"
service will not defeat jurisdiction. Superficially,
however, involuntary service casts questions on the
voluntariness of the initial entry onto active duty.

"See notes 6, 46 supra.
65

See note 32, supra and accompanying text.

